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Irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricingreal options haveled to
significantadvances many areas. We broadenthis range ofapplications, showing how the
techniques can apply to many policy problems in finance, macroeconomics, and trade
policy. With small changes, standardtechniques can handlea broad rangeofstrategic
problemsrelated to policy. The decision to commit is like the decision to make an
irreversible investment. Explicitly considering and correctly valuing theoption to wait
makesdiscretion relatively moreattractive, implies that increased uncertainty increases the
gainto discretion, and results in policy which displays hysteresis.IIntroduction
Irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricing real options
have led to significantadvances in capital budgeting, environmental economics, and
industrial organization. Wewish to broadenthis rangeof applicationsfurther, showing
howthe techniques can apply to many game theoretic problems in finance,
macroeconomics, and tradepolicy. We show how, with small changes, standard
techniques can handle a broad range ofstrategicproblems related to policy.
More specifically, we considerproblems ofcommitment. Thedecision to commit
is like thedecision to makean irreversibleinvestment. The previous literature on
commitmentconsiders a once-and-for-all choice between rules and discretion, and does
not allow future agents to adopt rules. If the optionto waitindeed haspositive value -- as
such options often do -- itaddsto the desirability ofdiscretion. Furthermore, because no
policymaker canbind itselfforever,we extend the analysis to consider entry and exit; not
from production, but from commitmentto a policy rule.
Ourpaperproceeds as follows. Section II discusses a variety ofmodels that fit the
general frameworkwepropose. It looks at the static games that section HI embeds in
continuous time. We choose games where commitment is sometimes useful: that is,
where the standard NCE (non-cooperative equilibrium, or nash-cournot equilibrium) leads
to a pareto inferioroutcome. Section III provides a very general way ofthinking about
policy, allowing costly commitment with costlyreversal. Continuous time highlights the
analogy with irreversible investment problems, as well as simplifying the model. We
illustrate how decisions to commitor renege depend on the commitmentand reneging
costs and on uncertaintyin theenvironment.In section IV weconclude by emphasizing three general results. First, the option
to wait, which we have restored to the policymaker’sdecision problem, both makes
commitment less attractive and implies that increased uncertainty makescommitmenteven
less so. This is the “bad news principle” ofirreversible investment applied in a policy
context. Second, by allowing thecommitment decision to takeplace in “real time,” we
note that the policy choice process displays hysteresis; the policy in force at a given time
depends on history, notjust theprevailing state. Third, we show that the ability to switch
regimes means that small changes in the underlying statecan induce large changes in the
relevant expectations; consequently, variables sensitive to expectations (such as asset
prices) can move quickly and asymmetrically, showing adecided non-linearity.
II. Preliminary Examples
In this section, wepresentseveralconcrete examples in which commitmentmatters
and regretis possible. We begin with one from bank regulation. The banking focus also
indicates how to use irreversibility forpolicy rather thaninvestment decisions (see Pindyck
[1991] or McDonald and Siegel [19861).
BankRegulation
Consider the following game between a regulator and a bank (or the banking
system). The regulator may choose to be either tough (T) or weak (W). Tough
regulators do not bail out insolvent banks: weak regulators do. A bank chooses to be safe
(S) orrisky (R). Ifbanksare truly safe, the regulator prefers to relax his vigilance, takeit
easy, and be weak. Ifbanks are risky, theregulator prefers to be tough. Ifthe regulator is
2tough, banks have an incentive to stay safe, but if the regulator is weak, they would rather
choose risky. The strategic form ofthe game then looks like (GO).
(GO) Payoffsfor Game between Regulator and Banks
Banks
Safe Risky
Regulator Tough 0, 0 -8, -4
Weak 4, -8 -8, -7
(See Mailath and Mester [1994] or Kane [1989] formore sophisticated approaches to
closure policy, which do not, however, addressthe dynamic commitmentproblem.) The
NCE is (Weak, Risky) but both parties would prefer (Tough, Safe). Theregulator can
accomplish this by committing to play tough, binding itself to play T no matterwhat
happens’. With a regulator dedicated to playing T, banks will Choose S. Hence thevalue
ofcommitment2.
Now let’scomplicate the example by bringing in thepossibility ofregret. So far,
theregulator is always happy aboutcommitting to be tough. Suppose, however, that in
some states of the world, the regulator regrets this. In good states, weprefer to have a
tough regulator who eliminates thecostly wealth transfers from taxpayers to bank
‘The notion behind this game is that tough regulators will not bail-out an insolvent bank,leading the
banks to undertake safe investments, so that no bail-out is needed. A weakregulator will bail-out the
banks, and so banks choose the more profitableriskyinvestment, some fail, and the regulatormust bail
them Out.
2Those familiar with game theory may notice that this is a game in which the Row player has “staying
power.” In the standard classifications of the 78 distinct bimatrix games, it is Brams Number 68. A
similar game, Brams Number 63, would suit our purposes as well. See Brams, 1983.
3investors, but in bad states, we prefer theweak regulator. Perhaps in the bad state (say a
recession) systemic risk means that being tough leads to a financial panic.
(G 1) PayoffFunctions for Game between Regulator and Banks
Banks
Safe Risky
Regulator Tough -u2, -u2 -8-u2, -4-u2
Weak +4- u2, -8-u2 -8-0.5u2
, -7-O.5u2
For small values ofu, this game has the sameequilibrium as (GO), to which it
reduces when u is zero. This game has a “prisoners’ dilemma” flavor about itfor small
values ofu, in that both parties would very much prefer the Tough, Safe, payoff. For
large shocks to the economy, however, that is, for largeu, theWeak, Risky equilibrium
becomes preferable--perhaps reflecting that in a systemic crisis, weneed to bail out the
banks, evenif that means theymakeriskier investments3. In this case, the regulator would
regret anycommitment to afixed rule of being tough.
In the next section wederive the optimal policy when u follows a more general
process and when the regulator has acost of committing andacost ofreneging on that
commitment, but some central insights ariseif we considera simple two stateexample,
with u =0 or u=6.
Section III uses positive and negative shocks. Inthis example, it doesn’t reallymake sense to consider
u <0. Section III couldeasily accommodate one-sided shocks by using geometric Brownian Motion.
4Because the policy decision takes place in real time, we have two cases to
consider. Either the economy starts out in the good state, or it starts out in the bad state.
Suppose the economy starts out in the good state. If the regulator is weak, he gets a
payoff of-8 today and chooseswhether to be weak again or tough next period. Ifthe
regulator is tough, he gets a payoff of 0 today and remains tough forever, as the only way
to be tough is to commit forever. This immediately shows where the option valueenters:
being weak today retains the option to committomorrow, and this option has value. The
analogywith irreversible investment is direct.
The standard time-consistency literature, however, comparesrules with discretion
as a once-and-for-all choice. Unless theregulator commits to rules at the beginning of
time, the suboptimal or“weak” choice is made in eachperiod. Making such a decision
forever seems simple-minded in this simple model, yet itis analogous to therestriction
implied by posing therules versus discretion question in the standard way. Drawing the
analogy to investment under uncertainty highlights a flaw in the standardapproach.
A striking consequence ofthe option value, the bad news principle, also arises in
this example. We suspect this principleliesbehind a pronounced tendency we have noted
in the arguments over rules versus discretion. The rhetoric advocating discretion
accentuates the negativepossibilities, the down side, a focus on the worst outcomes, of
rules.
In this example, the bad news principlearises because theregulator sometimes
regrets the commitment to be tough. The regulator never regrets an initial decision to be
weak, since it canlater commit to be tough. Increasing the payoffto toughness does not
5affect the relative payoffs -- and thus the choice -- today. This illustrates the principle:
Only news about the bad outcomes affectsthe choice between rules and discretion.
Theabove formulation differs from the standard approach in a more subtleway,
necessary, but not sufficient, for irreversibility. Thestandard approach makes a timeless
comparison before thefull state oftheeconomy is known. By contrast, in this paper the
government operates in “real time” and knows thecurrent state oftheeconomy, just as in
the irreversible investment literature theinvestorknows today’s rateofreturn. Again, this
twist follows naturallyfrom the investmentanalogy.
Continuing the example shows how the standardtimeless comparison can lead to
the wrong conclusion because itignores theinformationthe government can use.The
standard approach gives the regulator two strategies: either commit to being tough or
allowdiscretion, which in our simple exampleamounts to playing Weakforever.
The regulator, though, has anotherpossibility. Operatingin real time, the
regulator can observe the economy and chose rules or discretion. Ifthe good stateturns
up, the regulator should be tough. If the bad state occurs theregulator chooses Weak
today, and choosesagain nextperiod.
Macroeconomic Policy
A game with a somewhat different flavor is presentedin (G2)
6(G2) Payoffs forgame between Fed and Treasury
Treasury
Tight Easy
Fed Tight 2-u2, I-u2 -3u2, -3u2
Easy -3u2, -3u2 O.5-O.5u2,l.5-O.5u2
This is a version ofthegame known as “Chicken” or“Battle ofthe Sexes.” Its
clearest macroeconomicinterpretation was presentedby Sargent,who argued in
“Reaganomics and Credibility” (1986) that tight monetary policy is compatible with tight
fiscal policy but not with easy fiscalpolicy. Who gives in and accommodates theother’s
policy, the Fed or the Treasury? In (G2),such a conflictexists for small values ofu, but
easy policy is better forlarge shocks, and indeed forms a Nashequilibrium. This captures
theintuitive ideathat fora massive real shock, easy policy is better. The Fed, by
committing to Tight, can enforce its preferred equilibrium, but itregrets this choice in
times oflarge shocks.
Pindyck (1977) considered sucha coordination problem in more depth,analyzing a
dynamicgame between the fiscaland monetary authority. Each authority has adifferent
objective in controlling the economy. He did not consider the irreversibility aspect of
policy choice.
In Haubrich and Ritter (1996) we analyze commitment to monetary rules in the
traditional time inconsistency setup (Barro and Gordon, 1983). A third monetary policy
application derives from observations about the fragility offixedexchange rateregimes.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)lay out thefollowing case: (1) Maintaining a fixed exchange
7rate is technically feasible for almost any country; (2) under normal circumstances,
countries gain (orthink theygain) from fixing theirexchange rate; but (3) thecollateral
damage caused by an attempt to defend thepeg when threatened by a terms-of-trade shift
or some other shockmeans the government’scommitment to its rate may not be credible.
Thus, even the strongest legal commitments to fixed exchange rates---currency boards, for
example---will not always succeed (Zarazaga, 1995). Nevertheless, despite compelling
arguments that they will ultimately fail, countries continue to adopt fixed-exchange-rate
policies. We describe aframework which can provide apositive theory ofthe switches
between the policy regimes.
Trade Policy
Some insightinto thedynamics oftrade agreements might be gainedfrom (G3). The
players arecountries, say Argentina and Brazil. Eachchooses between high and low
tariffs. The noncooperative equilibrium ofthe game is high tariffs in both countries. Both
countries would ordinarily gain by coordinating on low tariffs, and this outcomecan be
achieved by establishing afree trade area, i.e., by committing. But when Brazil
experiences arecession, measured by its unemployment rate u, its imports from Argentina
fall, tempting Argentina to leave the free trade area and raise tariffs. Brazil responds and
raises its tariffrate as well. Brazil sees reduced imports as an advantage, so for this game
its payoffs are increasing in u. We assume that Argentina’s economy is stable,and that
Brazil always stands open to the trade pact, sothat Argentinaeffectively decides the
extent of free trade. Clearly afully-satisfactory model here would involve more symmetry
8and give Brazil incentives for breakingthe trade pactas well. We include it to illustrate
the rangeofproblems our approach can address.
(G3) Payoffs in Free TradeGame
Brazil
Low High
Argentina Low 8-u2, 8+u2 -2, 9+3u2
High 9-u2, -2 0,0
As mentioned before, the payoff structure ofexamples (Gi) , (G2) and (G3) has
more general applications. Thetractability ofthequadratic model makesit a natural
approximation for manycommitmentproblems (along with many othereconomic
problems as well) Thus, additional examples suchas adhering to theGold Standard (with
regret in a waror depression), grantingpatents forthe exclusive use ofnew technology
(with regretin cases such as AZT), or allowing constitutions to bind future legislatures
could illustrate ofour main point4.
~‘In fact, from our perspective, the tractability constraint doesnot bind us exclusively to quadraticpayoffs.
For us, the morebinding constraint in thecontinuous time models was theneed to posit an essentially
static underlying game. This too, we conjecture,need not be abinding constraint with sufficient
mathematical expertise.
9III. Entering and Exiting Commitment
Mechanisms to commitirrevocably are almost impossible to imagine. It is not
difficult,however, to thinkofexamples ofmechanisms that make it costly fora firm or a
governmentto alter its policy. A constitutional amendment, for example, is difficult to put
into place and difficultto remove. Ordinary legislation has lower costs at both ends. For
a firm, the corporate charter, financial agreements, and strategicplans play a similar role.
Institutions can effectively tie theirhandsloosely or tightly, being able to escape if they
will to bearthe appropriate level ofpain. For any particular decision these costs can
usually be taken as given: passing a law, amending the constitution,issuing a regulation.
Infuture work we hope to make thechoice ofcommitmentmechanismendogenous.
We maintain thetraditional semantics ofcommitmentand discretion, but we wish
to highlight a bias in tone thatcreeps intothe discussion when commitment is not
irrevocable. This innovation forces us intothe useofwords like “renege” and “weasel”
with clear negativeconnotations which weregard as unfortunate. We interpret the results
ofthis section as a model ofoptimalbehavior and tolerate the terminologyonly to fitour
paperinto the literature on rules and discretion.
A world in which policymakerscan, at a cost, enterand exit commitment (or, more
generally, any policy regime) bears aclose similarity to Dixit’s [19891 model ofthe entry
and exit problem faced by competitive firms.
While a discrete time approachcan sometimes handle particular versions ofthe
problems5 (as Lambson [19921 doesfor entry-exit decisions), the continuous time
~For some specialized problems thediscrete time approach is more natural. One workhorse of the
dynamic inconsistency literature inmacroeconomics, the unanticipated money model, doesnot easily
generalize to continuous time. Weexamine it in acompanion paper(Haubrich and Ritter, 1995).
10approach,exposited in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) generally proves more convenient. A
generic quadratic payoff model captures the main points in a simple yetgeneral context.
A Quadratic Model
We implement theseideas in continuous time as follows. The policy authority, the
Fed for example, will be followingeither rules or discretion. The payofffrom discretion,
which depends on the state ofthe economy u, is
(1) pD(uyd+du+du2
Thepayoff from rules is
(2) pR(u) = r0 +i~u+r2u2.
Following examples (Gl) and (G2), and by analogy with the previous sections, we assume
that rules tend to be preferred when theshock is small, so that for small u,
pR (u) > p~) (u). We assume that u follows a simple Ito process
du = adt+odz
wherea describes thedrift ofthe process and ~denotes its standard deviation, with dz
describing a white noise Wiener process.
The optimal policy switches between the two quadratic payoff functions with cost
C ofcommitting to rules, that is ofmoving from discretion to rules, and cost W (for
weaseling) of moving from rules to discretion6. To solve this weemploy the general
methods of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Our problem maps most naturally into an entry and
6 Allowing weaseling adds acomponent similar to the“escape clause” models ofFlood and Isard (1988)
and Lohinan (1992), who consideracost to renege. In one sense we generalize those models by allowing
a positive cost ofrecommitmentand allowing delay in recommitment. In anothersense, those models are
more general in that they allow more general state contingent rules. We prefer to focus on the dynamics.
11exit problem. Unlike the problem for firms, where uncertainty over prices is best modeled
by geometric Brownian motion, for many problems two-sided shocks are more natural and
therefore are bestmodeled with Brownian motion, which may turn negative. Weather, oil
price shocks,trade flows, and interest rateshifts may all takepositive or negativevalues.
Consequently, where Dixit and Pindyck’s problem has two boundaries, onepriceat which
the firmenters the market and another priceat which the firm exits, ourproblemhas four
boundaries: two above zero and two below zero.
In what follows, wederive thedifferential equations forthe valuefunctions, and
derive the smooth pasting and value matching conditions necessary forthe optimum ofthis
stochastic control problem. The conditions give us the necessaryequations to solve
numerically for the boundaries between therules region and the discretion region. Full
details can be found in the appendix.
In the interior of the discretion region, the valuefunction for the problem obeys:
rVD = pD(u)+’E[dvD]
dt








VD +a1’~ —rV’~ _pR
Each ofthese is a second order linear differential equation, and standard solution
techniques are available.
12In the solution, there are three regions: arules regions centered about zerofor
small shocks, and discretion regions forlarge positive and largenegative shocks. This
necessitates three solutions to theequations, depending on which region we are in. Each
solution takes the form of a general solution plus SR or ,a quadratic particular
solution to the differentialequation7. For therules region the solution is
(3) VR(u)=B,e~1u+B2e~+S~~(u),
with 131 > 0 and 1~2<0.
Forthe high (positive) discretion region,we have the corresponding solution
VD(u) = A,6e~’ + ~h e~2u + SD(u).
The particularsolution S’3(u) turns out to be thevalue ofdiscretion forever, so that the
two exponentialterms arethe valueoftheoption to commit. (See also Dixit and Pindyck
[1994], chapter 6 section 2.) Forvery large shocks u approaching infinity, itbecomes
exceedingly unlikely that theregulator will evercommit (recall itprefers discretion for
large shocks) and sothe value ofthat option approacheszero. This means the termwith
the positive exponent, l3~, must vanish forlarge u, implying A,6 must be zero. This leads
to the simplifiedexpression for thevalue functionin thehigh (positive) discretion region:
(4) V~ (u) = A21 e~2u + SD (a).
After employing asimilar argument for the lower (negative) discretion region we have
(5) VD (u) = A,,en”+ SD(u)
~The particular solution is all that would change ifwe used a form costs other than quadratic.
13Four boundaries define the regions. Two boundaries determine when the regulator
“weasels” out ofrules and adopts discretion, one atthe upper boundary u~and one at the
lower boundary u~.The other two boundariesdetermine when a discretionary regulator
commits to rules, entering thecommitment region from above, ü~,or from below, u~.
With the general form ofthevalue function in hand, wecan find theboundary
values by imposingthevalue-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. Forexample, at
the upper commitmentboundary, the value ofcontinuing in discretion just equals thevalue
ofadopting rules and paying thecost to commit:
(6) Vh(uC)=V(uC)-~C.
Likewise, the smooth pasting conditions impose equality on the derivatives ofthevalue
functions:
(7) V”2(i~) =
This is repeated for each boundary, leading to eight equations(one value matching and
one smooth pasting condition for each boundary) in eight unknowns (four boundaries and
four undetermined coefficients). The appendixsets out these equations and provesthe
existence and uniqueness ofthe solution.
Numerical Solution and Comparative Statics
As frequently happens in the stochastic control literature, closed form solutions do
not seem to exist for this problem, and weresort to numerical methods. Gauss NLSYS
was able to solve theeight simultaneous equations, though convergenceofthe algorithm
was sensitive to starting values. The actual numerical solutions are less interesting than
the comparative static results. Starting from a base caseof C = W = 0.01, a = 0,
142 = 0.01, and r =0.02, figures 1 through 4 depict thesolutions under a variety of
parametervariations.
Figure 1 highlights the importanceofhistory. Itdepicts a solution and one sample
pathfor the shocks,the commitment and weasel boundaries, and shades thetime spent
committed to rules. Because the weasel and commitboundaries differ, in some states of
theeconomy (levelsofu) currentpolicy depends on past policy. Foranything above the
upper commitline and below the upper weasel line, a regulator committed to rules sticks
with rules and aregulator using discretion sticks with discretion. Quite apparently, then, it
is incorrect to judge policy simply on the current state ofthe economy, and particularly
inappropriate to naively contrast currentpolicy with past policies ata similar state ofthe
economy orstageofthe business cycle. In a word, ourmodel predicts policy hysteresis.
This shiftingreemphasizes a point stressed by Flood and Garber (1984) in theirwork on
the gold standard: to evaluatea policy rule, theentire dynamic policy sequence must be
analyzed, including those periods where discretion reigns.
Implicit in the hysteresis is something so obvious asto possibly escapenotice.
Namely, thepolicymakerswitches from rules to discretion, and from discretion to rules,
over time. Regimes shift. Discretion,commitment, and weaselingout ofcommitment, will
all occur.
Figure 2 plots thecommitment and weaselboundaries as thecommitment cost
changes, keepingthe weasel cost fixedat 0.01. Noticethat forany particularcommitment
cost, the regulator adopts rules for “small” shocks on either side ofzero. For larger
shocks, the Fed adopts discretion. This is a natural consequence ofthe quadratic payoff
function.
15Another prominent feature is that the weasel boundary is further out than the
commitboundary. Were there no cost of switchingbetween regimes, the boundaries
would be the same, at V,,’3 (u) = V” (u) where theexpected gain from continuing discretion
just matches the expected gain from using rules8. Adding a commitmentcost drives a
wedge between the two valuefunctions and requiresthat theregulator gain evenmore
from rules. This means moving theboundary further into the area where rules are
preferred, i.e., closer to zero. Similarly a cost to backing out ofrules means shifting the
boundary evenfurther into thearea where discretion is preferred, that is, away from zero.
Hence the weaselboundary is further out than thecommit boundary.
Figure 2 shows that as thecost ofcommitmentincreases, the less likely the
regulator is to commit. As the cost increases, the relative benefits of rules over discretion
must also increase, and sothe commitmentboundary shrinks towards zero. For high
enough cost, commitmentnever occurs.
One other morepractical advantage ofthe continuous time formulationlies in its
ability to allow easy exploration ofa broad range ofquestions such as changes in entry and
exit costs and variability ofthe shocks.
Figure 3 illustrateswhat happens whenthe weasel costvaries. As the cost of
switching out ofrules rises, it takes an increasinglylarge benefit ofdiscretion over rules to
makethe switch worthwhile, and so the weasel boundary increases. Notice in both figures
2 and 3 that a rise in commitmentcost primarilymoves thecommitment boundary and a
8 In the zero cost case, the first order conditions (valuematching and smooth pasting) have mnultiple
solutions,one of which is thesolution to the original problem. For all positive costs, the solution is
unique.
16rise in weaseling cost primarily moves the weasel boundary. This reflects the relatively
low variance ofu. At thecommitmentboundary, the probability is low that the process
will soon wander as far asthe weasel boundary, and so this has little weight in the
optimizationproblem making the weasel boundary almost perfectly flat. When the
boundaries areclose, asfor small values ofC and W, both boundaries move more
noticeably with an increase in eithercost. Ahigher variance for u makes theeffect more
pronounced.
Figure 4 illustrates a different exercise, in which the variance ofthe Brownian
motion governing the shocks is increased. As thevariance rises, thecommitment
boundaries decrease and the weaselboundaries increase. This is a consequence ofthe
options componentofthe decision. As the variance rises, so too doesthe option value of
“not switching.” For example,in thediscretion region, a high variance means there is a
good chance ofmoving deeperinto thatregion in thenear future, but also a good chance
ofmoving intothe rules region. The bad news principleenters here. Ending up deep in
thediscretion region meansregretting thecommitmentto rules. Ending up deep in the
rules region, meanscommitting to rules whenyou get there, so committing todaydoesn’t
help. Thus, the high variancemakescommitment less likely, and correspondingly, the
commitmentboundary decreases. With a high enough variance, the regulator never
commits.
ExpectedTime in Regime
Since wepropose a model with discreteregime shifts, howlong the currentpolicy
regime is expected last is critical in applicationssuch as asset pricing, where agents must
look into the future. Forexample, monetary policy conducted under discretion mayresult
17in a higher inflation ratethan policy conducted under rules. Most bond traders--and
academics studying theterm structure ofinterest rates---concede theinfluence of
monetary policy. Most would also concede frustration in understanding that influence. At
times modestincrease in the Federal Funds rate lead to sharp increases in long rates; at
times modestdecreases lead to sharp increases, and at other times modestchanges
provoke modest changes9. Thinking aboutpolicymakers as entering and exiting
commitment, with its associated non-linearities and hysteresis, can shed some light, and
perhaps one day, some quantitative evidence, on the matter.
To obtain an idea ofhow the expected time in a regime behaves, weset up the
following simulation. We let the underlying shockfollow Brownian motion with a
variance of0.1. We sampled this process 120 times atmonthly intervals, assuming
commitment boundariesof+2 and -2 and weasel boundaries of+3 and -3. This is meant
to capture the ideathat thepolicymakerperiodically, but not continually, reviews policy
based on the indicators of the underlyingeconomy. Fora given starting point, we
generated 1000 runs ofthe Brownian motion path, keeping track(by month)when the
path was in the rules and thediscretion region (which is obviously path dependent).
Averaging over the 1000 runs gives an estimate oftheexpected fraction of time spent in
each region over thenext 10 years. Figure 5 reports the results. The X-axis reports the
starting value forthe simulation and the Y-axis reports the fraction oftime spent in
discretion. For example, if thecurrentvalue ofthe underlying shock is 1.5, the expected
fraction oftime in discretion is only 0.04 ( or 4.8 months out of 10 years). In other words,
‘~See Goodfriend, 1993, orCampbell 1995 for amplificationof this point.
18the amount of time expected to be spent in discretion over the next ten years is trivial
given a starting point this far into the rules region. Thefigure reports two numbers for
starting values between 2 and 3, depending on whetherthe starting value is assumed to be
in the rules or thediscretion region.
If, as mentioned above,thediscretion regime results in a higher inflation rate, the
datashown in figure 5 caneasily be translated into a numerical inflation premium. Say
that rules produce zeroinflation and discretion produces constantinflation of 10 percent.
Then theaverage expected inflation over the next ten years is 0.4 percent when the
underlying stateis 1.5 but risesrapidly thereafter.
Three lessonsemerge from figure 5. It emphasizes and quantifies the importance
of hysteresis forforward-looking variables. For a starting value of2.5 in therules region,
the policy makerexpects to be in discretion only aboutone third ofthe time over the next
ten years. Ifthat samevalue of2.5 is in the discretion region, thecorresponding number
is abouttwo-thirds. This implies that expectationsare asymmetric during increases and
decreases ofthe shocks. Equally important, expectations can changequickly once the
shocks approacha boundary. Theexpected time in discretion changes from 0.001 to
0.009 in movingfrom 0 to 1, but changes from 0.16 to 0.86 in moving from 2 to 3. The
relationbetween the underlying shockand the result is decidedly non-linear.
These results imply that inflationary expectations, and thus long terminterest rates,
canchange dramatically withouta shift in policy, aspeople anticipate that a newpolicy
regime is more likely. These shifts dependedsensitively on theunderlying stateofthe
economy, and what policy regime currently obtains.
19Conclusion
Viewing commitmentas irreversible investment has two major advantages. It
provides a new perspective on questions ofcommitment, rules, and discretion, clearing up
some troubling aspects ofthe literature. Equally important, that perspective representsa
new and useful directionfor theirreversible investment literature. It appliesquite naturally
to strategicinteractions-- games-- withoutthe need for drastic revision. Though we don’t
wish to downplay thedifficulties arising in each specific case, such as dealing with
different stochastic processes ormultiple boundaries,the basicconcepts and techniques of
investmentunder uncertainty gain a wider applicability.
Thus, along with providing new answers to old questions, this approach also raises
new questions. By making thecommitment versus discretion problem more amenable to
attack by the techniques of financial economics, anew set oftools, and problems, naturally
arises. For example, policy commitment should matter forasset prices--consider a shift in
monetary policy, a poison pill being activated, or shift in bank closure policy. Conversely,
asset prices may allow us to estimatecommitmentprobabilities and other fundamentalsof
the model.
This means that apowerful set oftechniques stands ready to address significant
questions in banking, finance, and economics.
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22Appendix A: Theoretical Solution
1. Solving for the Value Functions
This partofthe appendix solves thedifferential equations ofsection III to find the
value functions. For reference, those two equations are
!~2VD+aVD_rVD _pD
for the interior of thediscretion region and
V~ +a1’~_rVR _pR
for theinterior oftherules region.
Both areequations ofthe form
ay”(x) + by’ (x) + cy(x) = qo + q1x + q2x2 Q(x)
The solutions to the homogenous part are
y(x) = A1e~ + A2e~~x
where 13, are solutions to thecharacteristic equation
a?~2+ bX + c = 0.
Since c <0 in our application, wehave one positive and one negative root. Let
132 <0 < 131. The particular solution can be a quadratic:
y(x) = so + s,x + 52~
y’ (x) = s, + 2s2x
y”(x) = 2s2
Substituting yields
qo + q1x + q2x2
= a(2s2) + b(s, + 2s2x) + c(so + s1x + 52X2)
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c
Since Q(x) is either ~pJ) or -P”, we have one particularsolution fordiscretion and one for
rules, call them ~ D and S R
Thereare three regions: high-u discretion, low-u discretion, and rules. Take these
in order. For high-u discretion the solution is
V D(u) = A,,,e~” + e~2u+S ‘3(u).
Substituting So, s1, and 52 into the quadratic particular solution makes itclear that S ‘3(u)
turns out to be the value ofdiscretion forever, so the other terms are thevalue ofthe
option to commit. (See Dixit and Pindyck [1984] chapter 6 section 2.) As u—~oo this
option becomes worthless, sowe need to have A1,, 0 (since 13~> 0). So the solution we
have(equation 4 ofthe paper) is
V ~(u)=A ,,e~2u+S ‘3(u)
For low-u discretion we need A2, = 0. Otherwise the value option to commit explodes as
we getfarther in the negative directionfrom thepoint atwhich we would want to commit.
Soin the low-u discretion region we haveequation (5) of thepaper
V~ ‘ 3(u) =A,,e~+S D(u)
Therules region is bounded, so neither option termdrops out, and thesolution is equation
(3) ofthe paper:
V ‘‘(u)=B,e~ +B2e~2t~ + 5 R(u)
The value function mustalso satisfy thefollowing value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions:







We have 8 equations and 8 unknowns, A,,, A26, B,,B2,u~,u~,u~,and u~.
2. Existence and Uniqueness ofSolutions
To establish the existence and uniqueness ofthe solution, we usea variation on the
approach usedby Dixit (1989, unpublished appendix).
Preliminaries
First we define two functions which measure thedifference between the value
functions(analogues ofDixit’s G(P) function) forthe upper and lower boundary pairs:
= B,e~°~ + B2e~2u+ 5R (u) — e~2u— S’3(u)
=B1e~+D2e~2lC+Q(u)
L(u) = VR(u) — V’2(u)
= B,e~+B2e~2u+ S”(u) — A11e~ — S’3(u)
=D1e~+B2e~2~4 +Q(u)
where D1
= B, - A11, D2
= B2
- A26, and Q(u) = S”(u) — S’3(u). 5R and 51) arethe
particular solutions for thedifferential equations that lead to thevalue functions.
Next, weneed to establish that Q(u)is convex. Convexity follows from our
assumption that therules lossfunction is more convex thanthe discretion loss function
and from the formulae for 5” and ~
The introduction ofD, separates theproblem offinding the upper boundariesfrom
that offinding the lower boundaries. Without loss ofgenerality we consider only the
upper boundaries, concentrating on the function H(u;B,,D2). Wherethere is no chance of
confusion, we suppress thedependence ofH on its parameters and write H(u).
25Existence
Consider the upper boundaries. Wedefine a sequence offunctions H, (and
corresponding B~and D~) which converge to a function H which satisfies the smooth-
pasting and value-matching conditions. Let
Ho(u) = Q(u)
Keeping D2
= 0, set B,’ so that
H,(u) = B1
1e~”+H0(u)
is tangent to the horizontalline at +W. This can be accomplished by some B,’ <0 because
H,’(u) increases withoutbound as we increase B,’ and decreases withoutbound as we
decrease Bj’. This produces a local maximum since B,’ <0 (Note: We can not start with
D2 because Q may not intersect -C.)
Now let
H2(u) = D~eP2L’+ H1 (u)
H2 is increasing in D~and H2’ is decreasing (since 132 <0) without bound in D~.
Increase D~to makeI~i2tangent to -C. This will be a local minimum. Notice that this
puts H2 aboveH, at the pointwhere H, is tangent to +W.
Now let
113(u) = B~e~°’ + H2(u)
Decrease B,3 to restoretangency with +W. Continue this process, thus generating the
sequence.
Note that H, goesoffto +oo to the left ofthetangencies and offto -oo to the right;
as illustrated in figure Al. At each stageofthis construction, thereis an increasing
segmentof H, to theright of the local minimum and to the leftofthe local maximum. Let
(B,1, D,,~be theaccumulation ofthe B and D~ in H,. We have shown that this sequence
is always moving northwest in B, - D2 space. This sequence cannot, by construction, go
into a region where H1’(u) <0 forall u.
To show convergence we need to bound the (B,1, D21} sequence. Notice that both
exponentialterms aredownward-sloping, so we can find bounds on B,, and D2, separately.
26The only interval on which Hcould possibly be increasing on the B, steps (that is, H for
odd i) is between theminimum ofQ, denoted u0 and the largest solution to
H~(u) = 13,B~e~” +Q’(u) = 0, denoted by u”~.(There are generally 2 solutions because
Q’(u) is linear while —f3,B~’e~’ is convex. See figureA2.) We know u~ <u * because
13 ,B,’e~” >0 and B,’ was chosen so that H,’(u*)=O. Hence 13,B,’e~’intersectsQ’(u).
See figure Al.
A simple bounding argument will eliminatethe possibility ofan increasing H even
on this interval. For u~ [u0, u*j, we have that H,’(u) <0 for u > u* and i> 1:
H,’(u) = ~ + ~2D21e~2M+ Q’(u)




The first inequality comesfrom the factthatthe {B,,} is a decreasing sequence ofnegative
numbers. The second follows from thefactthat D21 > 0 with 132 < 0. The third from the
factthat —13,B,’e~’°’ cuts Q’(u) from below at u’~, so that both increase on [up, u*]. Again,
see figure A2. On ~ u*], e~and e~2”are minimized and maximized, respectively, at
u~,since both are monotonic. Similarly, the slope ofQ is maximized at u~.
Hence, therecan be no increasing portion ofH~(u) if
13,B,e~+Q’(u*) <0
for all u E [u~,u*}. This condition holds if
_Q’(u*) _Q’(u*) B << = negative constant
f3,e~” 3,e~1u
Similarly, for the D2 steps (H, for even i) therecan be no increasing portion of
H(u) on [u0, u*] if
132D2e~2u+ Q’(u*) <0
or





Therefore the sequence (which is moving northwest) is bounded in the region 0>
B, > negative constant, 0 <D2 <positive constant.
Uniqueness
Recall that thedefinition of D2 abovereduced theproblemto separate sets of 4
equationsand 4 unknowns, two boundaries (two values ofu) and two undetermined
constants. The uniqueness prooffirst shows that, forany given valueofthe constants, the
boundaries are unique, and then shows that the constants are unique.
Define u~ (B, ,D2) and u~ (B,,D2) as therespective values ofu where thelocal
minimum and maximum ofH(u;B,,D2) occur. First we show that there can be only one
minimum u,, (B,, D2), and one maximum u~(B,, D2) forH givenB, and D2.
Lemma: For given values of B, <0 and D2 >0,H‘(u;B,,D2) =0 has at most 3
solutions.
Proof: Write H’ = 0 as
—Q’(u) = 13,B,e~” + 132D2e~2u
Since Q is convex, the LHS is a decreasing line. The RHS is downward-sloping, convex
to the left and concave to the right -- like a cotangent function. Obviously there will be no
more than 3 solutions. ~
Given the shape ofH (that is, lim~~ H(u) = +oo, lim~~ H(u) = —oo, again see
figure Al),solutions to H’(u)=O come in pairs. To have more than one minimum and one
maximum, then, we would needat least 4 solutions to H’ = 0. But the lemma shows that
we can have atmost three,and sincewe have already proven existence, weknow exactly
two solutions exist,a unique maximum and a unique minimum. This implies that
u~ (B,,D2) and u~(B1,D2)are well defined, single-valued, functions.
Now to completethe proof, we show that B, and D2 are unique. The proof
proceeds by contradiction.
Define
28lT~ (B, ,D2) ~ ~ +D2e~2~~) + Q(u~ (B,, D2))
F~(B,,D2) B,e~~~’)2) + D2e~’~’)2) + Q(u~(B,,D2))










H~ = 0 because u~ (B~ ,D2) and u~(B, ,D2)are chosen so that the smooth-pasting





Now we show that a second solution cannotexist. Note that if (B1’,D~)is a
second solution to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions with B’> B,, we
must have D~ <D2 to maintain thevalue-matching conditions: [‘~ (B[,D~) = —C and
[‘~,,(B,’,D2’)=W.
Let b = B[—B, >0 and d = D,’ —D2 <0. The line segmentjoining thesolutions
is (B, +tb,D2 +td). Wehave
~F(B +tb,D
dt C 2 aid, aD2
= ~ +
Given ourhypothesis that F~(B, ,D2) = F~(B~,D~) = C,
290 = ‘~C(Bt~D2)F~(B,,D2)




Again, because ofthe shape of H,
u~(B, ,D2)<u~ (B, ,D2)~ e~1~D2) <e~1 ~ and e~2~~’32)> e~’~
Recall that b > 0 and d < 0. Subtracting the two integrals, we get
0 = 5’ [b(e~1~~t1)2) — e~1u~~81~’32))+ d(e~’1)2) — ~
Theintegrand is always negative, so the integral cannotbe 0. That is, both solutions
satisfy the value matching conditions only if they areidentical.l
Thus, B, and D2 are unique, and so uniquely define u~(B,,D2) and uw (B,, D2),
and thus the entire solution is unique.
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H(uw) = W, H(uc) = —C,






Solutions to H~(u)= 0
Q’(u)
U